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Abstract
Recklessness involves unreasonable/unjustified risk-taking. The argument here is 
that recklessness in the criminal law is best understood as nevertheless containing an 
element of reasonableness. To be reckless, on this view, the defendant must reason-
ably believe that she is exposing others to a risk of harm. If the defendant’s belief 
about the risk being imposed by her conduct is unreasonable, she should not (nor-
mally) be considered reckless. This point is most important in relation to offences of 
endangerment where recklessness sets the outer limits of criminal liability.
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1 Introduction
Recklessness involves unreasonable/unjustified1 risk-taking. The argument here is 
that recklessness in the criminal law is best understood as nevertheless containing an 
element of reasonableness. To be reckless, on this view, the defendant must reason-
ably believe that she is exposing others to a risk of harm. If the defendant’s belief 
about the risk being imposed on others by her conduct is unreasonable, she should 
not (normally)2 be considered reckless.3
 * Findlay Stark 
 fgs23@cam.ac.uk
1 Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
1 I treat these terms as synonymous: see Findlay Stark, Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negli-
gence in the Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), Ch. 1.
2 The “normally” caveat covers (presumably rare) cases where the defendant unreasonably over-esti-
mates the probability of harm involved in Φing, but it would have been unjustified to run the (lower) risk 
that it would have been reasonable to believe existed in the circumstances. Such defendants, who should 
be considered reckless regarding the lower risk, will not be considered again until Sect. 7.
3 In cases where there is an unreasonable under-estimation of risk, the defendant may instead be negli-
gent: see Stark, Culpable Carelessness, Ch. 8.
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The need for this reasonableness requirement becomes clearest through consider-
ation of endangerment offences. Where recklessness marks the boundary of criminal 
liability for such offences, a belief-centred view of recklessness, which would not 
enquire into the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief regarding the relevant risk, 
can conduce to over-criminalisation. Section 2 presents examples designed to trigger 
intuitive recognition of the potential harshness of this belief-centred approach. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 then suggest two responses to this problem. The first insists upon the 
presence of “concrete” endangerment, i.e., someone in fact being placed in harm’s 
way by the defendant’s conduct.4 This approach would over-privilege various forms 
of luck, and pay insufficient attention to culpability. The second response to the 
problem, requiring reasonable beliefs about risk, avoids these problems.5 Insights 
from the literature on the structurally similar problem of “factually impossible” 
attempts will be relied upon to advance this thesis. Remaining objections and clari-
fications to the reasonable-belief-based view of recklessness presented in Sect. 4 are 
considered in Sect.  5, before a definition of recklessness that reflects reasonable-
ness’ role within it is provided in Sect. 6. Section 7 then considers exceptional cases 
where the defendant’s belief about risk is unreasonable, and yet a finding of reck-
lessness remains justified.
2  Problematising the Belief‑Centred View of Recklessness
The problem with a belief-centred view of recklessness is often veiled in real-life 
endangerment cases, because most defendants have what appear to be reasonable 
beliefs about the dangers involved in their conduct. Consider (an embellished version 
of) the English case of Parker.6 Parker was a lodger (an informal subtenant) in a semi-
detached Council house (a form of social housing) leased to Smith.7 Smith was dis-
satisfied with her accommodation. In a misguided attempt to help her, Parker set fire 
to Smith’s sofa (couch) whilst she was out, hoping to render the house uninhabitable 
and cause the Council to rehome her. Parker did not check if his neighbours in the 
connected property were home before starting the fire.8 Assume, for the purposes of 
5 The point could be made by reference to the comparable concept of justification for the relevant belief. 
There are, however, difficulties in probing defendants’ precise justifications for forming particular beliefs. 
See Stark, Culpable Carelessness, pp. 135, 236–240.
6 “R v Parker”, Criminal Law Review, (1993): pp. 856–857 (E&W). The issue in Parker arises not infre-
quently—see e.g., Cooper [2004] EWCA Crim 1382 (E&W); Brewis [2004] EWCA Crim 1919 (E&W); 
Harris [2013] EWCA Crim 223 (E&W).
7 This is an invented name (no name is given in the case report).
8 If Parker believed that the connected home was unoccupied, he would not have been reckless, but only 
(potentially) negligent with regard to the risk of endangering another person’s life (cf. Castle [2004] All 
E.R. (D.) 289 (Oct.) (E&W)). Negligence is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 The distinction between “concrete” and “abstract” endangerment is elaborated upon in Sect. 2.
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this article,9 that Parker believed that his neighbours10 might be home and in danger of 
being killed in the fire.
Parker was charged with aggravated criminal damage, contrary to section 1(2) of 
the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (which applies to England and Wales):
(2) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property, 
whether belonging to himself or another
(a) intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to 
whether any property would be destroyed or damaged; and
(b) intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or 
being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endan-
gered;
shall be guilty of an offence.
Parker’s defence was that, as the neighbours had (it turned out) not been home at the 
time of the fire, their lives were never endangered.
Laypersons may think that Parker had a point. As a matter of ordinary English, 
it could be argued that “endangerment” requires that a particular interest was, col-
loquially, put “in harm’s way”.11 Limited support for this view can be found in dic-
tionary definitions of “endanger”: e.g., “to put someone or something at risk or in 
danger of being harmed, damaged, or destroyed”12; “put (someone or something) at 
risk or in danger”.13 Unfortunately, for Parker, the criminal law detects an ambigu-
ity in such ordinary-language definitions, and identifies two types of endangerment: 
“concrete” and “abstract”.
9 Parker’s account was that he simply did not think of the neighbours. At the time, English law’s 
approach to recklessness required merely that he took an unjustified risk that would have been obvious 
to the reasonable person: Caldwell [1982] A.C. 341 (E&W). Nowadays, Parker would need to himself 
believe that the relevant risk existed at the time of starting the fire (or “close his mind” to that risk): G 
and Another [2004] 1 A.C. 1034 (E&W).
10 Questions about whether Parker believed that fire fighters, etc. would necessarily respond to the blaze, 
and might be at risk of being killed, will be left aside. See, however, People v Rodriguez, 442 N.Y.S.2d 
948 (1981) (NY); David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law, 15th edn. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 1092.
11 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pushing this point.
12 https ://dicti onary .cambr idge.org/dicti onary /engli sh/endan ger.
13 https ://en.oxfor ddict ionar ies.com/defin ition /endan ger.
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As Antony Duff explains,14 borrowing from German criminal theory,15 “con-
crete” endangerment involves an interest actually being placed in harm’s way by 
Φing16: in Parker, the neighbours would have to be home at the time of the fire 
for their lives to have been “concretely” endangered. “Abstract” endangerment, by 
contrast, involves a situation where, although an interest was not put “concretely” in 
the path of harm by Φing, Φing is the type of activity that tends towards “concrete” 
endangerment, even if each token of that activity does not involve it.17 Starting a fire 
in a domestic property certainly can be that type of activity.
Parker’s argument was “obviously a bad one”,18 because aggravated criminal 
damage is clearly an offence of “abstract” endangerment: the defendant need only 
be “reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered”, i.e., 
believe there is a risk of a “concrete” danger of death, and choose to continue with-
out adequate justification. The question is whether, despite these points, Parker’s 
argument should be sound in theory. Is there something in the use of recklessness 
without a requirement of “concrete” imposition of danger that renders such endan-
germent offences “sub-optimal” or “poorly drafted”, as Alex Sarch has (tentatively) 
suggested?19
The case for such sub-optimality is partly intuitive, and arises from considera-
tion of more sympathetic examples than Parker. Sarch’s own example involves sec-
tion 211.3 of the Model Penal Code (MPC), which states that: “A person [commits 
an offense] if he threatens any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or 
to cause … serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of caus-
ing such terror or inconvenience”. There is, again, no apparent requirement of “con-
crete” endangerment: the “external” elements are satisfied upon proof of the threat 
16 R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 
2007), p. 163. See, also, Brenner Fissell, “Abstract Endangerment, Risk and the Politics of the Criminal 
Law”, American Criminal Law Review, 51(3) (2014): pp. 657–668, 667.
17 Another way of explaining this idea is in terms of the combatting of “potential risks”, if “risks” is 
understood in a “concrete” manner here: Fissell, “Abstract Endangerment”, p. 657.
18 See J.C. Smith’s commentary on Parker in “R v Parker”, p. 857.
19 Alexander Sarch, “Review of Findlay Stark, Culpable Carelessness”, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 
12(4) (2018): pp. 725–730, 728–729.
14 Other authors draw this distinction differently. For instance, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch 
draw it along epistemic lines: if the defendant knows that he is not putting anybody at risk (e.g., he 
knows that the neighbours are out), that is an instance of “abstract” endangerment, whereas if the defend-
ant does not know if he is putting anybody at risk, this is an instance of “concrete” endangerment—
Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation (Oxford: Hart, 2011), p. 76. This 
means that most cases of endangerment are “concrete”, including all of the cases discussed here, thus 
draining the distinction of any useful content in this context. Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner draw 
the distinction along the lines of the likelihood that someone will be in harm’s way: if it is likely that 
someone will be in harm’s way, that is an instance of “concrete” endangerment, whilst if it is not likely 
that someone will be in harm’s way, that is an instance of “abstract” endangerment—Preventive Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 102. If likelihood is assessed in terms of a reasonable belief 
that someone will be put in harm’s way by the defendant’s conduct, then this sense of “concrete” endan-
germent may accord with the view defended below. It is, however, unclear what Ashworth and Zedner 
would say about that precise point.
15 See, also, Markus Dubber and Tatiana Hörnle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 591–592.
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of a crime of violence. The remaining heavy lifting, in terms of criminal liability for 
endangerment, is done by the defendant’s mental state of purpose or recklessness 
with regard to “concrete” danger.
Sarch’s example is as follows20:
Suppose Falecia has a terrible sense of humor and thinks it would be hilari-
ous to call Warner Brothers Studios and threaten to “drug everyone there to 
death.” She does not intend to terrorize or inconvenience people, but genu-
inely believes there is a substantial risk that this will result from her prank. 
However, suppose her belief is simply false. Falecia’s voice sounds exactly 
like the adorable cartoon character Tweety Bird[21] from the Warner Brothers 
TV show Looney Tunes. Thus, no one hearing her would understand her to be 
menacing in the slightest. Indeed, any listener on the phone would misunder-
stand her as saying that she wants to hug everyone there to death. Accordingly, 
there actually exists no risk that terror or serious public inconvenience will 
result from Falecia’s prank.
Sarch worries that it may be “overly harsh” to convict Falecia,22 and that a belief-
centred view of recklessness (specifically, mine)23 may thus lead to “implausible” 
results.24 Despite her culpable choice, made in the light of her beliefs about the 
“concrete” dangers her conduct would impose on others, the legislature might, on 
grounds of “e.g., … compassion, generosity or political prudence” decide not to 
define offences of endangerment so as to capture actors like Falecia.25
A difficulty with Sarch’s example is that it is hard to make sense of Falecia’s 
“prank” if she lacks the purpose of being taken seriously, thus causing at least 
“serious public inconvenience”.26 Presumably, if she is not believed, the “prank” 
fails.27 Sarch’s example can be fleshed out to avoid this problem. Perhaps Falecia’s 
friend works at the studio, and she intends that he answers and is personally afraid 
(momentarily), before Falecia reveals it is a “prank”. She believes, however, that 
there is a risk that her friend might over-react, causing “serious public inconven-
ience”. Given Sarch’s stipulations, there is at least a case to be made for the unrea-
sonableness of such a belief, but Falecia nevertheless formed it. If the belief-centred 
view of recklessness is correct, then Falecia is guilty of the MPC offence.
Sarch’s example may trigger the right sort of intuition about the harshness of a 
belief-centred view of recklessness in this context, but it is slightly eccentric. Paul 
25 Sarch, “Review”, p. 730.
26 I am grateful to Christopher Cowley for nudging me to clarify this point.
27 See R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 61.
20 Sarch, “Review”, p. 729.
21 A.k.a. Tweety Pie, particularly in the UK. (I never thought I would write this footnote, either.).
22 Sarch, “Review”, p. 729.
23 See Stark, Culpable Carelessness, Chs. 4–6.
24 Sarch, “Review”, p. 728. Another way of expressing the same idea is that a belief-based view of reck-
lessness is “extreme, but not (quite) absurd”—see Kenneth Simons, “Retributivism Refined—or Run 
Amok?”, The University of Chicago Law Review, 77(1) (2010): pp. 551–584, 554.
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Robinson provides a more realistic example, based on the offence of reckless endan-
germent contained in section 211.2 of the MPC: “A person commits a misdemeanor 
if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in 
danger of death or serious bodily injury”. The wording is, once again, clear on this 
offence’s non-“concrete” nature (“places or may place …”).28 Recklessness regard-
ing the relevant “concrete” dangers can once again do the heavy lifting in terms of 
liability.
Robinson’s example is as follows29:
Consider a single-parent law professor [call him Kasper] scheduled to bring his 
children to a conference in Israel. Television reports from the area show what 
is essentially a war zone. He is anxious to attend the conference, however, so 
he disregards the serious risk to his children and goes to the conference as 
planned. Once he arrives, he realizes that all of the violence is in Ramallah[30] 
and that there is no danger of violence in Tel Aviv, the site of the conference. 
Having never been to Israel, he had incorrectly assumed that the Ramallah vio-
lence threatened Tel Aviv. His children are not and never have been in danger.
Robinson assumes that “most people” would not want Kasper to be convicted of 
reckless endangerment, because he “did not put his children in danger; he only mis-
takenly believed that he had”.31 If the belief-centred view of recklessness is correct, 
however, Kasper is guilty.
Intuitions will no doubt vary in outcome and in strength in relation to these exam-
ples. They nevertheless raise a worry about the belief-centred view of recklessness’ 
plausibility when recklessness regarding “concrete” endangerment sets the bounda-
ries of liability for endangerment offences.32 One might be tempted, on the basis of 
29 Paul Robinson, “Prohibited Risk Creation and Culpable Disregard or Inattentiveness: Challenge and 
Confusion in the Formulation of Risk-creation Offenses”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 4(1) (2003): pp. 
367–396, 385.
30 Robinson does not explain the significance of these locations, and it is not self-evident. Ramallah is 
approximately 39 m/63 km from Tel Aviv, and there is a national border and other cities between the two 
locations. Presumably, then, the inference to be drawn is that the distance and barriers in place mean that 
Tel Aviv is not credibly threatened by the violent unrest. The need for such an explanation/inference sug-
gests that the example is not as simple as Robinson suspects, which is the conclusion that will be arrived 
at below in Sect. 4.
31 Robinson, “Prohibited Risk Creation”, p. 385. Indeed, Robinson fears that the MPC would convict 
Kasper of manslaughter if the children were unexpectedly killed by terrorists: p. 385.
32 Robinson’s own solution is to split off the idea of “prohibited risk” (a “rule of conduct”) from reck-
lessness (a “rule of adjudication”). The “risks” at issue ultimately appear to be determined by reference 
to the reasonable person’s standpoint (e.g., Robinson, “Prohibited Risk Creation”, p. 386). This makes 
Robinson’s solution potentially similar to the one provided below, but the point is not entirely clear. Fur-
thermore, a large part of the case for splitting “prohibited risks” from recklessness concerns situations 
where risk is mentioned, but a fault element regarding those risks is not required. My sympathies lie with 
the view that such offences of strict liability endangerment are illegitimate (see n. 38, below).
28 See Michael Cahill, “Attempt, Reckless Homicide and the Design of Criminal Law”, University of 
Colorado Law Review, 78(3) (2007): pp. 879–956, 925–926; Duff, Answering for Crime, p. 163. Cf. 
Peter Westen, “The Ontological Problem of ‘Risk’ and ‘Endangerment’ in Criminal Law”, in R.A. Duff 
and Stuart Green (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 309; American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries: Part 1—General Provi-
sions (Philadelphia, PA: American Law Institute, 1980), pp. 197, 203.
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these examples, to hold that it must be “true” that the relevant danger in fact existed 
before liability for an offence premised on reckless endangerment can follow. The 
next sections explore two possible understandings of this requirement.
3  Requiring “Concrete” Endangerment
The first response to the problem identified in Sect. 2 would be to insist that those 
offences should be interpreted to require “concrete” endangerment of the relevant 
interests. On such views, “the mere apparent ability to inflict harm [would] not [be] 
sufficient” for liability.33 This would lead to the acquittal of all of the defendants 
discussed thus far.
It is possible, but rare, to find endangerment offences that at least appear to insist 
on “concrete” endangerment in this manner. For example, section 5.1.28 of the Aus-
tralian Model Criminal Code states that: “A person: (a) whose conduct gives rise to 
a danger of death to any person, and (b) who is reckless as to the danger of death 
to any person that arises from that conduct, is guilty of an offence.” Without more, 
subsection (a) might be read to require that a “concrete” danger is in fact caused to 
a person’s life as an “external” element (“gives rise to a danger …”), independent of 
the fault element of recklessness contained in subsection (b).34 There is, however, an 
important caveat in section 5.1.27(4): “… it is not necessary to prove that a person 
was actually placed in danger of death or serious harm by the conduct concerned”. 
With that, the “concrete” cracks.
It is easy to see why “concreteness” is eschewed in the model Australian offence, 
and in the offences mentioned in Sect. 2. The only real argument in favour of requir-
ing “concrete” endangerment is as follows: if it is legitimate to criminalise Φing, 
because Φing involves harm x, then it is unproblematically legitimate to criminalise 
Φing if it carries with it the “concrete” danger of harm x materialising.35 Any plau-
sible conception of the harm principle will accommodate such “primary” risks of 
harm x.36 “Abstract” endangerment, by contrast, involves the criminalisation of risks 
of “concrete” danger, which at first might be thought to rule out more conduct, and 
thus be more problematic in criminalisation terms.
This is, however, a weak argument for requiring proof of “concrete” endanger-
ment. First, citizens often will not know, ex ante, if interests are “concretely” being 
put in danger by Φing.37 Requiring “concrete” endangerment does not, then, actually 
33 Commonwealth v Trowbridge, 261 Pa. Super. 109, 115 (1978) (PA). See, further, Westen, “The Onto-
logical Problem of ‘Risk’”, p. 309.
34 A similar approach could be adopted within the definition of recklessness, itself—e.g., in Wisconsin, 
where recklessness exists where “the actor creates an unreasonable and substantial risk … [and] is aware 
of that risk”: Wisconsin Criminal Code, s. 939.24(1) (WI).
35 Duff, Answering for Crime, p. 161; Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 39.
36 Simester and von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, p. 76.
37 Simester and von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, p. 77.
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help citizens to plan their conduct so as to avoid liability, meaningfully preserving a 
wider sphere of personal freedom.
Second, consider cases, like those in Sect.  2, where recklessness regarding the 
relevant endangerment is necessitated.38 A risk of a “concrete” danger of harm x 
is, in reality, just a (lower) risk of ultimate harm x.39 Consider if there was a 50% 
chance that Parker’s neighbours would have been killed if they had been home, and 
a 10% chance they were home. This suggests that there was a 5% chance of their 
being killed. Two points flow from this. First, if “substantial” risk-taking is required 
for recklessness (which is plausible, if controversial),40 then at some point the risk 
that ultimate harm x will occur will not require justification, given its small size. 
Secondly, if the risk of ultimate harm x is substantial enough to warrant justification, 
it will be easier to justify the risking of ultimate harm x at a certain level of removal. 
Justifying “concretely” risking somebody’s life, for example, is harder to justify 
than risking that the conditions might arise where somebody’s life will “concretely” 
be put at risk. It is even easier to justify taking the risk that conditions might arise 
where somebody’s life might be “concretely” endangered, and so on. At some stage, 
the ease of justification will remove any meaningful impact on citizens’ freedom.41
There are further convincing reasons to reject a requirement of “concrete” endan-
germent.42 First, “concrete” endangerment imposes law-enforcement costs in estab-
lishing whether a person was in fact in harm’s way, which will not always be clear.43
Second, it is not clear that such costs would be worth bearing in principle: a 
requirement of “concrete” endangerment pays insufficient regard to equivalence in 
moral culpability.44 Consider, an identically placed defendant to Parker, Barker, who 
sets a fire in identical circumstances, with the same beliefs about the circumstances 
and the risk of death arising from them. Barker’s neighbours are, however, home 
40 My view is that the legislature should have to show that a particular, problematic level of risk-taking 
existed before it can require citizens to answer publicly for their conduct. The level of “substantial” risk-
taking need not be static across risked interests. See Stark, Culpable Carelessness, pp. 11–16. Cf. Larry 
Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan with Stephen Morse, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Crim-
inal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 25–27.
41 This demonstrates how mens rea terms can set more acceptable limits on criminalisation decisions. 
See Winnie Chan and A.P. Simester, “Four Functions of Mens Rea”, Cambridge Law Journal, 70(2) 
(2011): pp. 381–396, 393–395.
42 It has also been argued that utilising “abstract” endangerment reduces the risk of over-zealous inter-
rogation of the safety of activities by the state: Simester and von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, p. 
77. As will be noted in Sect. 5, however, “abstract” endangerment may, if combined with a belief-centred 
view of recklessness, be very intrusive.
43 Simester and von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, p. 77.
44 Hereinafter, I will use “culpability” to stand in for “moral culpability”. Where (so to speak) “legal cul-
pability” differs, this will be indicated explicitly.
38 It is not essential for offences of “abstract” endangerment to require a mens rea state (whether reck-
lessness or negligence) regarding the relevant risk(s) or harm(s). The defensibility of offences of endan-
germent that do not require a fault element regarding the relevant dangers is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but see Ashworth and Zedner, Preventive Justice, p. 115. My sympathies lie with the view that 
such offences (and, indeed, other offences of “strict liability”) are indefensible, but advancing that view 
fully is impossible in the space available here.
39 Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 255. See, too, 
David Lanham, “Danger Down Under”, Criminal Law Review, (1999): pp. 960–969, 963.
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when she starts the fire. Both Parker and Barker believe that Φing will expose others 
to a substantial risk of the relevant harm, and choose to Φ without adequate justi-
fication. These choices demonstrate the same level of insufficient concern for the 
interests of others,45 generally taken to be the gist of culpability.46 For authors such 
as Larry Alexander and Kim Ferzan, then, unless these defendants satisfy the condi-
tions of a mental condition defence,47 both may48 be punished to the extent that their 
culpable choices warrant.49 Yet if aggravated criminal damage were to require “con-
crete” endangerment (as Parker contended), Parker would be acquitted and Barker 
convicted. Such an outcome would over-privilege (various forms of) luck50 and 
downplay Parker’s equal culpability.
The case against “concrete” endangerment is convincing. There remains an 
important question, though: how does one decide on the boundaries of any alter-
native? Requiring “abstract” endangerment does not, in itself, answer this ques-
tion, at least without an understanding of what it means to take a risk of “concrete” 
endangerment. Should we, adopting Alexander and Ferzan’s view, allow any con-
duct that the defendant believes exposes others to a risk of the relevant “concrete” 
danger51 (provided that risk-taking is unjustified) to be the basis of endangerment-
based liability? This would mean convicting all of the defendants in Sect. 2, which 
has already been recognised as intuitively questionable. The next section con-
tends that there is a principled middle road between this intuitively harsh, belief-
centred approach and “concrete” endangerment’s blunt insensitivity to concerns of 
culpability.
4  Requiring Reasonable Beliefs About Risk
The germ of the solution to the dilemma in Sect. 2 is identified by Sarch, who sug-
gests that “awareness of risk”—a core component of many accounts of recklessness 
in Anglo-American criminal law52—could be construed in terms of a “true belief 
45 See, e.g., Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, pp. 86–87 (n. 2), 94, 152, 195–
196, 222–223. See, also, Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Danger: The Ethics of Preemp-
tive Action”, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 9(2) (2012): pp. 637–668.
46 See Stark, Culpable Carelessness, p. 3 and the sources cited there.
47 Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, pp. 45–46, 223 (n. 23).
48 For them, culpability is the basis of desert, but deserved punishment need not be pursued if this would 
be unduly costly: Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, pp. 7–9.
49 Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, p. 193. See, too, Robinson, “Prohibited 
Risk Creation”, p. 387.
50 In Nagelian terms, a mixture of at least two types of luck: “circumstance” luck (“the kind of problems 
and situations one faces”) and “outcome” luck (“luck in how one’s actions and projects turn out”): see 
Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) p. 28.
51 A defendant who believes that there are risks attendant upon Φing is secure from liability for an 
offence premised on reckless endangerment unless and until she believes that she is Φing. Sitting at one’s 
desk, abstractly contemplating the risks to life associated with the (mis)use of certain gas appliances, 
does not turn one into a reckless endangerer of life. See Stark, Culpable Carelessness, p. 120.
52 See Stark, Culpable Carelessness, Ch. 2.
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that the risk exists”.53 Sarch points out that “awareness” is a “factive” mental state54; 
“necessarily, one has it only to truths”.55 Belief, by contrast, is non-factive—which 
gives rise to the dilemma at the core of this paper.
It is unclear from Sarch’s brief explanation what he thinks a “true” belief in risk 
consists in.56 It has already been demonstrated that it should not be understood in 
terms of requiring “concrete” endangerment. Are there workable alternatives that do 
not simply collapse into a belief-centred view of recklessness?
Alexander and Ferzan suggest that the answer is “no”, arguing in favour of 
assessing “the risk” that existed in any given circumstance exclusively in terms of 
the defendant’s own (“subjective”) beliefs.57 In other words, for the defendant to 
“truly” be risking the interests of others by Φing would simply be for her to believe 
that such a risk attends Φing (and that she is Φing).
Their argument proceeds from the well-known point that risks only make sense 
in the light of incomplete factual information.58 With complete information, either 
the outcome will happen (probability = 1) or it will not (probability = 0). If that is the 
“truth” of the matter, no reckless defendant (i.e., a person who believes the harmful 
outcome’s probability is somewhere between 0 and 1) will have a “true” belief about 
risk. Risk is an incoherent notion from this perspective.
If it is to do any work conceptually, risk must accordingly be based on an assess-
ment carried out with incomplete information from the ex-ante perspective.59 Alex-
ander and Ferzan contend, however, that there is no non-arbitrary way to establish 
which pieces of information will be taken into account in establishing what risk of 
harm exists, apart from simply taking the defendant’s beliefs (however misguided) 
to be determinative.60 If this is what it is for a risk to “truly” exist,61 then every 
defendant will see the “true” answer, ex ante. A belief-centred view of recklessness 
follows inexorably from this conclusion.
56 This is not his fault; the suggestion is included in a book review.
57 Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, pp. 27–31.
58 For an overview, see Stark, Culpable Carelessness, pp. 16–20. For analysis of this point in relation to 
the MPC, see David Treiman, “Recklessness and the Model Penal Code”, American Journal of Criminal 
Law, 9(3) (1981): pp. 281–386, 318–322. I set aside issues of quantum indeterminacy.
59 See, too, Robinson, “Prohibited Risk Creation”, p. 386.
60 Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, pp. 29–30.
61 I assume here that Alexander and Ferzan mean to take (1) the defendant’s beliefs about “the risk” 
(e.g., the chances of harm x materialising) as determinative, rather than (2) the defendant’s beliefs about 
the facts, from which “the risk” is calculated in a more “objective” way (compatibly with what is said 
below). This is not always clear.
53 Sarch, “Review”, p. 730. In a footnote (n. 5), Sarch deals with differences between true beliefs and 
knowledge (which is, like awareness, factive). This makes it unnecessary to rehearse objections to under-
standing awareness of risk (and thus recklessness and negligence) in terms of knowledge about risks. 
Compare Stark, Culpable Carelessness, Ch. 5 and Douglas Husak, “Negligence, Belief, Blame and 
Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting”, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 6(3) (2011): pp. 
199–218.
54 See, too, Jennifer Nagel, “Factive and Nonfactive Mental State Attribution”, Mind and Language, 
32(5) (2017): pp. 525–544, 530.
55 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 34.
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Alexander and Ferzan are not right, however, that all alternative conceptions of 
“true” risk are wildly unfair, such that their use in the criminal law would be com-
pletely objectionable. First, following Eric Johnson,62 one could contend that the 
“true” risk that the defendant was taking should be assessed in the context of the 
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, unless any of those beliefs were 
provably false.63 If the defendant has a provably false belief about a circumstance, 
that circumstance and belief are simply ignored in calculating the relevant risk for 
the purposes of criminal liability. Say Parker starts his fire on a Wednesday at 3 pm. 
He believes that his neighbours are retired, and so tend to be home at that time of 
day through the week. In fact, his neighbours are in full-time employment and tend 
to be home at that time of day only during the weekend. On Johnson’s approach, 
Parker’s false belief about his neighbours’ employment status (and that particular 
circumstance) would be removed from the analysis of the “true” risk he was taking 
of “concretely” endangering their lives. One could then contend that Parker was not 
reckless regarding endangering his neighbours’ lives, because his belief about that 
risk of “concrete” danger did not match the “true” danger to the neighbour’s lives 
his act of arson in fact produced.
Johnson’s argument works well where the “truth” of beliefs about circumstances 
is readily apparent—whether Parker’s neighbours were home is, for example, pre-
sumably simple enough to work out—but other circumstances will be far less clear. 
Although not unruly and arbitrary, Johnson’s view may be impractical. This short-
coming is overcome by John Oberdiek, who would ask the following question to 
assess what the “true” risk was: what is the gravest probability of harm that the 
reasonable person would have estimated, ex ante, given the evidence available to 
the defendant?64 If the defendant made an unreasonable mistake about the level 
of risk involved in Φing, his belief would not be determinative of the “true” risk 
sought to be justified. Oberdiek’s view endorses a third way of looking at probability 
(and risk), which theorists such as Alexander and Ferzan tend to under-privilege: 
the view that probabilities are determined not only by the facts (chances), or by an 
agent’s “subjective” beliefs (credences), but also by reference to the evidence avail-
able, ex ante, of a certain proposition.65
It is worth noting that this reasonableness-based solution finds support in the lit-
erature on (one form of) “factually impossible” attempts. The relevant difficulty in 
such “factually impossible” attempts and the types of endangerment case presented 
62 Eric Johnson, “Is the Idea of Objective Probability Incoherent?”, Law and Philosophy, 29(4) (2010): 
pp. 419–432; Eric Johnson, “Knowledge, Risk and Wrongdoing: The Model Penal Code’s Forgotten 
Answer to the Riddle of Objective Probability”, Buffalo Law Review, 59(2) (2011): pp. 507–584.
63 I endorsed Eric Johnson’s solution in Stark, Culpable Carelessness, pp. 19–20. I am now more 
minded to accept John Oberdiek’s view, discussed below.
64 John Oberdiek, Imposing Risk: A Philosophical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 
Chs. 1–2.
65 See David Mellor, Probability: A Philosophical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2005), Ch. 1. See, 
also: Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2011), Ch. 10; Oberdiek, Imposing Risk, Ch. 2. I am grateful to Alexander Greenberg for 
encouraging me to clarify this point.
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by Sarch and Robinson is the same: taking the defendant’s beliefs to be determi-
native of criminal liability can lead to counter-intuitive, harsh results.66 The option 
again exists to hold all such actors (absent a mental condition defence) liable for 
their attempts. This is indeed Alexander and Ferzan’s position,67 and is sometimes 
found doctrinally.68
Factual impossibility is, nevertheless, a “perennially thorny problem”69 in theory 
and doctrine precisely because this approach appears too quick in certain (unusual) 
cases. This intuitive rashness accounts for an element of theoretical hesitation in the 
case of obviously doomed attempts.70 A similar reluctance is indicated by doctrinal 
responses to clearly impossible attempts, such as the encouragement of the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion in favour of not proceeding,71 rules allowing for the dis-
missal of proceedings,72 or substantive criminal law rules excluding liability.73
This trepidation can be explained on the basis of the lack of “dangerousness” 
of such attempts (if not also those who perform them—a point to be returned to 
below). It might, for instance, be that the only attempts that should be criminalised 
are those that pose a “real” social danger.74 The difficulty has been working out a 
coherent way to establish whether such a “real” danger existed, which mirrors the 
debate about what a “true” risk of “concrete” danger is in relation to the endanger-
ment offences introduced above.
Without rehearsing the whole debate, the relevant answer for present purposes 
focuses on whether the defendant’s conduct would have made a reasonable observer 
(or some related heuristic device)75 fear that the threatened harm may occur.76 This 
approach requires attempts to have a manifested connection with the world of rea-
sonableness, which has been variously expressed in terms of “aptness” for success,77 
69 Stephen Morse, “Reasons, Results, and Criminal Responsibility”, University of Illinois Law Review 
(2004): pp. 363–444, 391.
70 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 115; Fletcher, Rethinking 
Criminal Law, pp. 176–177.
71 See, e.g., A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, Findlay Stark, G.R. Sullivan, and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sul-
livan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 6th edn. (Oxford: Hart, 2016), p. 364; Ormerod and Laird, 
Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law, p. 498.
72 E.g., MPC, s. 5.05(2).
73 E.g., M.S.A. s. 609.17 (MN).
74 See Thomas Weigend, “Why Lady Eldon Should be Acquitted: The Social Harm of Attempting the 
Impossible”, DePaul Law Review, 27(2) (1977): pp. 231–274. Cf. Gideon Yaffe, Attempts: In the Phi-
losophy of Action and the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 242–243.
75 Usually, the reasonable person (or some such standard) is utilised. Cf. the reasonable expert stand-
ard proposed in Lawrence Crocker, “Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing Harmless Attempts”, 
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 53(4) (1992): pp. 1057–1110, critiqued well in Peter Westen, 
“Impossibility Attempts: A Speculative Thesis”, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 5(2) (2008): pp. 
523–566, 545.
76 This is something of a mixture of views. The differences between them are hopefully not important 
here.
77 Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, p. 150.
66 George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston, MA: Little & Brown, 1978), p. 160.
67 Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, pp. 194, 221–223.
68 E.g., MPC s. 5.01(1); Criminal Attempts Act 1981, ss. 1(2)–1(3) (E&W).
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there being a “real prospect of success”,78 and of “citizens of the jurisdiction … 
regard[ing] the actor’s conduct as a threat to interests that the statute seeks to pro-
tect”.79 Consider Duff’s test regarding factually impossible attempts80:
A defendant should be acquitted only if the intention with which he acted 
radically failed to engage with the world or if his action (as appropriately 
described) was obviously and completely unsuitable as a way of trying to 
[actualize] his criminal intention: if anyone exercising ordinary intelligence, 
and a basic knowledge of the world, would realize that it could not hope to 
succeed. Such conditions will not often be satisfied except by those who are 
mentally disordered or defective.
This test can be adapted for cases of reckless endangerment. It would require that 
a defendant should not be found to have recklessly endangered a particular interest 
if her belief that the relevant “concrete” danger might follow was one that nobody 
exercising ordinary intelligence, and possessing a basic knowledge of the world, 
would have formed.81 Another way of explaining the same idea is in terms of a 
requirement that the defendant not only believed that Φing carried with it the risk of 
a “concrete” danger of harm, but that this belief was a reasonable one to hold. Like 
Duff’s test for attempts, this would commonly be a “stealth” requirement: most sane 
defendants will satisfy it easily.82
Tests of this sort can identify cases where it becomes inapposite to describe the 
success or failure of an attempt in terms of “luck”.83 Similarly, when one unreason-
ably believed that Φing might result in “concrete” endangerment, it is not really a 
matter of “luck” that the relevant “concrete” danger did not materialise.84 It is cred-
ible to conceive of Parker as “lucky”, because it was readily plausible that his action 
would “concretely” imperil the lives of his neighbours, as Barker’s did. Parker and 
Barker could not control whether the neighbours were home, and they plausibly 
(depending on their schedules, etc.) could have been. Any reasonable person in those 
defendants’ ex-ante position, with their identical set of background beliefs about the 
circumstances and the dangers involved in their conduct, and the evidence available 
to them, would credibly have drawn the same conclusion: starting a fire will impose 
a certain level of risk of “concrete” danger to the neighbours’ lives (a level of risk 
that it is unjustified to take).
78 R.J. Spjut, “When Is An Attempt To Commit An Impossible Crime A Criminal Act?”, Arizona Law 
Review, 29(2) (1987): pp. 247–280, 278.
79 Westen, “Impossibility Attempts”, p. 560.
80 Duff, Criminal Attempts, p. 232. Cf. Yaffe, Attempts, pp. 251–254.
81 Compare New York Penal Law 150.15 (NY) (defining “arson in the second degree”), which—instead 
of reasonable perception of risk—requires an “apparent possibility” of harm. This test leaves unresolved 
the crucial question: apparent to whom?
82 For the idea of “stealth” requirements, see Westen, “Impossibility Attempts”, p. 548.
83 See Duff, Criminal Attempts, pp. 226, 231–232, 333, 380. See, also, Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov, A 
Philosophy of Criminal Attempts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 145–147.
84 It is, of course, “lucky” that the defendant was so constituted as to form the unreasonable belief, but 
resolving the issue of “constitutive” luck (and its implications for the free will/determinism debate) is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
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Contrast, Falecia’s case. Sarch’s stipulations perhaps make it unreasonable for 
Falecia to believe that there is a risk of a “concrete” danger serious public incon-
venience. It is, accordingly, less plausible to say that Falecia is “lucky” that her 
conduct does not result in a “concrete” danger of serious public inconvenience 
materialising.
Kasper’s case is more difficult. It turns, in part, on the matter of how well-known 
the geography of Israel is, and how this information bears upon the question of 
whether violence might spread, and thus whether Kasper formed a reasonable belief 
that there was a possibility that he was putting his children in “concrete” danger. If 
that was a reasonable belief to have formed, there is good reason to punish Kasper 
for reckless endangerment, despite his children’s lives never having been “con-
cretely” endangered. In such circumstances, it is plausible to say that Kasper was 
“lucky” that that “concrete” danger did not materialise, and it would under-play his 
culpability to acquit him.
Peter Westen provides an alternative response, which might be thought to be 
more precise than the one about reasonable beliefs defended here.85 His approach 
asks the finder of fact to consider whether it fears that the defendant’s conduct 
came “close enough” to causing harm, insofar as the relevant counter-factual cir-
cumstances in which the ultimate harm would have materialised are thought to 
be readily possible.86 This is a matter of “how easily fact-finders can imagine the 
occurrence of counterfactual conditions under which the fateful harms would have 
occurred”.87 It is not clear, however, how different this test is from one premised 
on the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that he is exposing others to a risk 
of “concrete” danger. Presumably ordinary citizens would view the harm as suffi-
ciently “close” when it was reasonable (from an ordinarily knowledgeable bystand-
er’s perspective) for the defendant to believe that someone could be “concretely” 
endangered by his conduct.
It has been argued that a reasonable-belief-based view of recklessness can 
avoid the pitfalls of a requirement of “concrete” endangerment with regard to 
equal culpability and “luck”, whilst avoiding the intuitive harshness of a belief-
based view of recklessness that does not enquire into reasonableness. Adding in 
a condition of reasonableness in recklessness will, however, require more infor-
mation to be available than a simpler, belief-centred view. Indeed, the main 
objection to the reasonable belief-based view of recklessness defended here is 
that it would unnecessarily complicate matters. The next section addresses such 
concerns.
85 See Westen, “Impossibility Attempts”; Westen, “The Ontological Problem of ‘Risk’”.
86 Westen, “The Ontological Problem of ‘Risk’”, pp. 323–324.
87 Westen, “The Ontological Problem of ‘Risk’”, p. 327. See, similarly, Peter Westen, “Resulting Harms 
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5  Objections and Clarifications
It is useful to begin by noting that the case for complicating the analysis of reck-
lessness in the manner described in the previous section is (even) stronger than that 
in relation to “factually impossible” attempts that are obviously doomed to failure. 
Attempts are “attacks”.88 Through intending to bring about harm, and taking (from 
his perspective) more than merely preparatory steps towards doing so, the defendant 
“relates himself as an agent as closely as he can to that harm”.89 That connection 
between agency and the world is looser when reckless endangerment of interests is 
involved; the defendant is not intending to cause harm. With that loosening comes a 
less secure basis for condemnation and deserved punishment.
Similarly, there may—given the defendant’s aim in bringing about the ulti-
mate crime—be a worry that the attempt may be repeated in circumstances 
where the crime can be completed.90 Even if this worry is grounded empiri-
cally,91 it is an unsatisfactory answer in the context of attempts, being prem-
ised on anticipated future criminality (with all of the epistemic difficulties that 
involves), and not present wrongdoing and culpability.92 It is even less convinc-
ing in the context of reckless endangerment. Even in real (and obviously threat-
ening) cases like Parker, it is unduly paranoid to worry that this is the first 
arson-based home improvement scheme of many, and hold that this is sufficient 
reason to punish the defendant now. Even where the defendant has a cavalier 
attitude towards risks (perhaps Kasper frequently demonstrates an insufficient 
regard for his children’s lives in his practical reasoning), punishing him where 
he unreasonably believes that he is exposing them to the risks of death/serious 
injury is redolent of pre-punishment for an anticipated undesirable choice or an 
extant character trait. The reasonableness requirement suggested here ensures 
that the state can only intervene when the defendant does something that plau-
sibly engages the world of risk in a threatening manner, respecting familiar 
concerns of privacy and individual autonomy.93 It is through such conduct that 
88 Duff, Criminal Attempts, pp. 363–366. On the general stability of the attacks/endangerment distinc-
tion, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “The Structure of Criminal Law”, Criminal Justice Ethics, 28(2) 
(2009): pp. 223–237, 229–231; Stark, Culpable Carelessness, pp. 223–225.
89 Duff, Criminal Attempts, p. 366. See, also, R.A. Duff, “Criminalizing Endangerment”, in R.A. Duff 
and Stuart Green (eds.), Defining Crimes: Essays on the Special Part of the Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 58.
90 Gerald Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland: Vol. 1, 3rd edn. by M.G.A. Christie (Edinburgh: Scot-
tish Universities Law Institute, 2000), p. 219; Sarah Christie, “The Relevance of Harm as the Criterion 
for the Punishment of Impossible Attempts”, Journal of Criminal Law, 73(2) (2009): pp. 153–164.
91 For doubts, see Seana Shiffrin, “The Moral Neglect of Negligence”, in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne 
and Stephen Wall (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy: Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 
p. 217.
92 See, further, Stefanie Bock and Findlay Stark, “Preparatory Offences”, in Kai Ambos, R.A. Duff, 
Julian V. Roberts, and Thomas Weigend (eds.), Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Justice: Vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
93 Duff, Criminal Attempts, p. 350; Kenneth Simons, “Does Punishment for ‘Culpable Indifference’ Sim-
ply Punish for ‘Bad Character’?”, Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 6(1) (2002): pp. 219–316, 231–233.
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citizens make their concern for others (a facet of their characters) susceptible to 
public examination in the way involved in criminal prosecution.94
Over-zealous public examination of citizens’ activities is a large cost of Alex-
ander and Ferzan’s belief-centred view—a cost they acknowledge,95 but is more 
important than they accept. As Alec Walen puts the point: “The degree of intru-
siveness necessary to police wrongful risk imposition would be unbearable, and the 
epistemic difficulties in sorting out who really believed what about the risks they 
were imposing on others would be insurmountable.”96 Viewing any action (carried 
out with the relevant set of beliefs) as a potential offence of reckless endangerment 
means that the usual evidence for inferring such a belief (the dangers that are reason-
ably thought to flow from action) will be absent, or at least less convincing. Absent 
reliable confession evidence, such cases may be difficult or impossible for finders of 
fact to assess consistently and well.
Alexander and Ferzan will point out (rightly) that these points are irrelevant to 
moral culpability, and (plausibly) that these epistemic difficulties will not always be 
insurmountable. But it is not clear that Walen’s concerns are so easily parried in the 
context of a real-world criminal justice system. Although this might seem to be a 
mixing and matching of conceptual and institutional arguments,97 that is only prob-
lematic if one has accepted that moral culpability is the be-all-and-end-all of legal 
culpability.98 The risk of over-intrusiveness at issue in this paper is a good reason 
against accepting that view. A reasonable belief-based view provides a necessary 
safety buffer. Many aspects of the criminal justice system (for example, the burden 
and the high standard of proof placed on the prosecution)99 already reach a similar 
compromise, and with good reason, given the horrendous consequences of punish-
ing the innocent.
These points are in tension with the fact that the criminal law is (rightly) very 
concerned with guiding conduct, and that investigating the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s beliefs about risk in cases of recklessness removes a degree of ex ante 
clarity. Alexander and Ferzan may claim that their account pays supreme respect to 
the guidance function: actors are judged on their beliefs (whether reasonable or not) 
and choices, and it is these, not what is factually the case or reasonable, that guide 
conduct.100 From a practical reasoning perspective, the cases discussed in this article 
97 Cf. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Review of Findlay Stark, Culpable Carelessness”, Modern Law 
Review, 81(6) (2018): pp. 1092–1096, 1095.
98 Alex Sarch explores a (not dis)similar sort of distinction in “Who Cares What You Think? Criminal 
Culpability and the Irrelevance of Unmanifested Mental States”, Law and Philosophy, 36(6) (2017): pp. 
707–750.
99 At times, it appears that the high standard of proof is the only protection Alexander and Ferzan think 
necessary: Crime and Culpability, pp. 318–320.
100 Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, p. 195. Cf. Jonathan Way and Daniel 
Whiting, “Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 20(2) 
(2017): pp. 361–374.
94 For a similar suggestion, see Tadros, The Ends of Harm, p. 96.
95 E.g., Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, p. 232.
96 Alec Walen, “Crime, Culpability and Moral Luck”, Law and Philosophy, 29(4) (2010): pp. 373–384, 
381. See, similarly, Westen, “Resulting Harms”, pp. 402–403.
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are indistinguishable.101 The belief-centred view of recklessness, in treating all of 
these cases alike, recognises this point.
This is, however, a perversion of the law’s guidance function, not an embrace of 
it. Granted, the criminal law cannot plausibly direct actors on the basis of the facts, 
because those facts will, ex ante, often be unknowable (particularly when a future 
result is at issue). The most obvious contrary position is not, however, to hold that 
the criminal law exists to guide the unreasonable and the grossly misguided.102 The 
better position, it is suggested, is that the criminal law’s instructions and prohibi-
tions are directed towards actors with reasonable beliefs (stemming from the evi-
dence available to them) about the dangers to which they are exposing others.103
Alexander and Ferzan may respond that such rules about reasonableness are nev-
ertheless wrongheaded, and the approach proposed here will be arbitrary in practice, 
in comparison with the simple(r) outcomes suggested by their belief-centred view 
of recklessness.104 Finders of fact will disagree about whether it was reasonable to 
believe that a risk of the relevant “concrete” danger existed. There are the familiar 
worries about what knowledge is ascribed to the ordinary, knowledgeable observer/
taken into account when assessing reasonableness.105 And it must be remembered 
that these already vague judgements will be made by laypersons without special 
training.
Reasonableness is often a vague standard, as are its equivalents.106 But such 
vagueness is more obviously problematic when it is used in an inculpatory than an 
exculpatory fashion. Inculpation using a vague standard is, indeed, something that 
the criminal law should avoid where it can.107 That is one reason not to use negli-
gence liberally in the criminal law.108 But the proposed reasonable belief standard 
suggested in this article would not convict anybody who would be acquitted under 
Alexander and Ferzan’s scheme. It will, instead, lead to the intuitively acceptable 
acquittal of a (small) number of defendants Alexander and Ferzan’s approach would 
101 Morse, “Criminal Responsibility”, p. 391.
102 Unreasonable and (perhaps) grossly misguided persons may, of course, still be capable of being 
guided by reasonableness, even if the position they can appreciate as being the “reasonable” one is, for 
them, unacceptably paranoid/relaxed.
103 This point is usually masked by a more common focus on the requirement that citizens form rea-
sonable beliefs to avoid liability, rather than as a condition of such liability existing. Negligence, for 
example, requires that defendants form reasonable beliefs about the risks associated with their conduct; 
reasonableness of belief perhaps ought to be required to avoid liability for mistakes in defences (though I 
cannot defend that claim here: see, further, Morse, “Criminal Responsibility”).
104 See their critique of the reasonable person test in negligence in Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, 
Crime and Culpability, pp. 81–85.
105 Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Response to Critics”, Law and Philosophy, 29(4) 
(2010): pp. 483–504, 490–491; Westen, “The Ontological Problem of ‘Risk’”, p. 321. For similar wor-
ries about a requirement of “minimal rationality” in the context of factually impossible attempts, see 
Richard Lippke, “Harm Matters: Punishing Failed Attempts”, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 14(2) 
(2017): pp. 629–646, 645.
106 Douglas Husak, “Why Punish Attempts at All? Yaffe on the ‘Transfer Principle’”, Criminal Law and 
Philosophy, 6(3) (2012): pp. 399–410, 408–409.
107 See Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, p. 63.
108 See Stark, Culpable Carelessness, pp. 260–266.
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convict. True, the line between conviction and acquittal will never be crystal clear. 
Some defendants will be treated harshly, others leniently. Convicting everyone, and 
depriving those with unreasonable beliefs of possible acquittals, is nevertheless an 
odd response to this fact.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that a degree of vagueness is not alien to Alexan-
der and Ferzan’s view. They allow the defendant who believes her risk-taking is jus-
tified (shows sufficient regard for the interests of others) to be held liable where her 
choice to Φ in fact manifests insufficient concern for the interests of others.109 This 
view is plausible. Taking the defendant’s beliefs about what is sufficient concern 
for others to be determinative would take some of the worst risk-takers beyond the 
criminal law’s reach, i.e., those who are so unconcerned with the interests of others 
that they think extreme risk-taking is justified, when a more “objective” view would 
reach a different conclusion.110 Any assessment of justification/sufficient concern 
other than the defendant’s is going to be just as susceptible to variation and opac-
ity as the reasonableness constraint on recklessness defended here.111 Ultimately, 
the question is whether there is simply “too much” arbitrariness if one goes beyond 
Alexander and Ferzan’s limited concession to a more “objective” perspective. It is 
not clear whether there is any answer to this question that is not, well, arbitrary.
Now that obvious objections to a requirement of reasonableness in recklessness 
have been dealt with, consideration will be given to how it could be implemented.
6  Recognising Reasonableness Within Recklessness
To recapitulate, if the defendant’s belief that she may “concretely” endanger oth-
ers was reasonable, then she should be convicted of an offence premised on reck-
less endangerment of a particular interest, even if nobody was, in fact, “concretely” 
endangered.
If the defendant’s belief that “concrete” dangers may be associated with Φing 
was unreasonable, however, only a slight degree of moral culpability-based justice 
is lost, and much else is preserved, through acquitting such defendants of offences 
premised on reckless endangerment.
Courts have, at times, appeared to grasp these points. In Sangha,112 for example, 
the (English and Welsh) Court of Appeal concluded that there was no need to prove 
“concrete” endangerment of life in aggravated criminal damage, so long as113:
110 Stark, Culpable Carelessness, p. 24.
111 See Simons, “Retributivism Refined”, pp. 579–583. Alexander and Ferzan now seem more con-
cerned about cases of “moral ignorance”, where similar errors are made. See Larry Alexander and Kim-
berly Kessler Ferzan, Reflections on Crime and Culpability: Problems and Puzzles (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2018), Ch. 6.
112 [1988] 1W.L.R. 519 (E&W).
113 At 525.
109 Alexander and Ferzan with Morse, Crime and Culpability, p. 59.
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[The] ordinary prudent bystander would have perceived an obvious risk that 
property would be damaged and that life would thereby be endangered. … The 
ordinary prudent bystander is not deemed to be invested with expert knowl-
edge relating to the construction of the property, nor to have the benefit of 
hindsight. The time at which his perception is material is the time when the 
fire is started.
The Court of Appeal’s decision was handed down at a time when Caldwell’s114 
more “objective” understanding of recklessness reigned. During the Caldwell era, 
the defendant’s “subjective” belief that the relevant risk existed was not a necessary 
component of recklessness. In consequence, the Court of Appeal in Sangha grasped 
only part of recklessness—that the relevant risk (of “concrete” endangerment of life) 
must be one that it would be reasonable to believe existed at the time the defendant 
acted. The other elements of recklessness (under-played during the Caldwell era) 
are that the defendant must have that reasonable belief himself, and choose to pro-
ceed without adequate justification. The modern English definition of recklessness 
in criminal damage, provided by the House of Lords in G and Another, grasps these 
other points: “A person acts recklessly … with respect to (i) a circumstance when he 
is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk 
that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take 
the risk.”115 One can only be “aware” of something if one believes it to be the case.
“Awareness”, as noted above, goes beyond this: it is a “factive” mental state, and 
incorporates a truth claim. If “true” risk is understood in terms of a reasonable belief 
that a particular risk exists, the G and Another definition of recklessness in terms of 
“awareness” of risk could be interpreted in line with this article’s argument. There is 
a danger, however, that “awareness” of risk may be misunderstood to require proof 
of actual, “concrete” endangerment. The arguments about “concrete” endangerment 
in this paper provide additional reasons,116 then, to reject definitions of reckless-
ness (and negligence) in “factive” terms such as awareness, knowledge, recognition, 
or realisation of risk, lest these be mis(understood) to require “concrete” endan-
germent. Although such “factive” terminology is common in the Anglo-American 
world, it may be confusing in terms of everyday speech.117 It would be preferable to 
define recklessness in terms of reasonable beliefs about risk.
The definition of recklessness that I provided in my earlier book118 could be 
amended easily to accommodate the argument made above (the change is in square 
brackets)119:
114 [1982] A.C. 341 (E&W).
115 [2004] 1 A.C. 1034, [41] (E&W) (quoting from Law Commission, A Draft Criminal Code for Eng-
land and Wales: Vol. 1 (Law Com. No. 177, 1989) cl. 18).
116 For others, see Stark, Culpable Carelessness, Ch. 5.
117 On the importance of such “everyday” understandings of words in the criminal law: see Stark, Cul-
pable Carelessness, Ch. 3.
118 Stark, Culpable Carelessness, p. 277.
119 There is no need to amend the definition of negligence, because—when understood in terms of the 
absence of a belief about risk—it is already implicitly asking a question about reasonable beliefs.
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Recklessness: A person is reckless with regard to a risk that a particular piece 
of conduct will be engaged in, consequence will occur or circumstance will 
exist (the relevant risk) where he: (i) [reasonably] believed that the relevant 
risk was connected with his behaviour and (ii) failed to alter his behaviour, in 
circumstances where this demonstrated insufficient concern for the interests of 
others. The belief that the relevant risk existed need not be at the forefront of 
the defendant’s mind at the time of acting.
In the run of cases, this understanding of recklessness will achieve justice. As the 
next section explains, there is, however, one exceptional case where the reasonable 
belief-based view of recklessness defended in this article should bend.
7  Over‑Estimation Cases
Consider a case where Carrie believes that, by driving near a school at 50 mph in a 
30 mph zone at break time (recess), she is imposing a substantial risk of death on 
pedestrians.120 This is a risk that, it is assumed, it would be unjustified for her to 
take. The children are, in fact, in class. Although it will depend on the precise cir-
cumstances, this may be a situation where: (i) it would have been reasonable for the 
defendant to believe that the probability of harm x was lower than what she, in fact, 
believed, but (ii) the risk of harm x that it would have been reasonable to believe 
existed would still have been unjustified to take, in all the circumstances. In such 
cases, the defendant is sufficiently culpable to be held liable for recklessly risking 
harm x, despite her unreasonable over-estimation. Carrie’s may well be such a case, 
if the children are obviously absent, but it would nevertheless have been reasonable 
for Carrie to believe that driving 20 mph above the posted speed limit carried with it 
a substantial risk of killing someone (a risk that she had no justification for taking).
The same is true of “result crimes”121 where, ex ante, the defendant unreasonably 
over-estimated the risk of the relevant harm.122 For example, Sally believes that the 
risk of killing someone by driving at the posted speed limit is incredibly high, yet 
chooses to do so. Frank emerges suddenly from a hidden alleyway next to the road, 
and is run over by Sally and killed. Sally should only be counted as having been 
reckless regarding killing another person if the danger of death that it would have 
been reasonable to have believed existed, ex ante, was, in the circumstances, unjusti-
fied for her to take. Here, that seems unlikely (assuming normal weather conditions, 
etc.), and this should preclude liability for a homicide offence that requires reckless-
ness with regard to the caused death.
120 This is an amended version of an example provided in Robinson, “Prohibited Risk Creation”, p. 387. 
Another familiar example is a defendant who believes, because her speedometer is broken, that she is 
travelling much faster than she, in fact, is, and is thus taking far higher risks with others’ interests. See 
Alexander and Ferzan, “Response to Critics”, p. 493; Robinson, “Prohibited Risk Creation”, p. 388.
121 See Gordon, Criminal Law, p. 59.
122 This point is noted in Robinson, “Prohibited Risk Creation”, p. 376.
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To cater for such cases, the following rule could be appended to the definition of 
recklessness given above:
Recklessness (over-estimation cases): Where a person unreasonably over-esti-
mates the extent of the relevant risk, he is nevertheless reckless regarding that 
relevant risk if a failure to alter his behaviour, in the light of the level of the 
relevant risk that it would have been reasonable to believe existed at the time he 
acted, would have demonstrated insufficient concern for the interests of others.
This solution covers cases of unreasonable over-estimation. It is worth stating 
explicitly that, in both endangerment and result crime scenarios, if the defendant 
under-estimates the relevant risk unreasonably, then she cannot be reckless with 
regard to the relevant risk. She might be negligent with regard to the relevant risk, 
but that is a different question altogether.123
8  Conclusion
The intuitive worries raised by Sarch’s and Robinson’s examples raise deeper questions 
about the extent to which moral culpability markers such as choices demonstrating 
insufficient concern for others should rule decisions about legal culpability, the scope of 
offences of endangerment, and when a defendant should be punished in the real-world 
context of a criminal justice system, with its appropriate circumspection about impos-
ing punishment upon citizens.124 The answer presented here is that, in the run of cases, 
a belief-centred view of recklessness that does not interrogate the reasonableness of 
those beliefs will indicate acceptably the boundaries of legitimate punishment, and that 
it would over-privilege various forms of luck to let liability to punishment depend on 
whether a person’s interests were, in fact, “concretely” endangered by the defendant’s 
conduct. Taken to extremes, however, a belief-centred view of recklessness conduces 
to harshness, invasiveness, and error. The preferable middle path (barring the cases of 
over-estimation dealt with in Sect. 7) is one premised on whether the defendant’s belief 
that his conduct could “concretely” endanger others is reasonable.
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